The network of global corporate control

Authors: Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battiston

PLoS ONE 6(10), e25995 (2011)
arXiv: 1107.5728v1 - DOI (q-fin.GN)
Submitted to arXiv on 28 Jul. 2011
Abstract

The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This core can be seen as an economic "super-entity" that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers.

The papers around it, by date and closeness

Higher is closer to this paper; left is older. Lines join papers close to each other: groups of lines are sub-topics. Select a point to see why it is there. Back to the summary of this paper

Closest papers Prior work it builds on Papers that cite it

Papers around this one

Ranked by how close their title and abstract are to this paper’s. Select some to read them together.

Closest papers

  1. Very close Cites this paper
    On Global Corporate Control: Review of an Article
    Bruce E. Parry · 2020 · Perspectives on Global Development and Technology · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    This article reviews “The network of global corporate control” by Vitali et al. (2011) where the authors use modern network theory to analyze the centralization of global corporate control. Specifically, they calculate how a central core of transnational corporations (TNCs) have control over the total operating revenue of all transnational corporations. They find that out of 43,060 transnational corporations, 737 top shareholders control about 80 percent of the value of all TNCs. This control is centralized in the financial sector and extends to other sectors of the economy, including manufacturing and services. TNCs are more global than ever before. They are in virtually every country of th…

  2. Very close Cites this paper
    Financial Intermediaries and Capital Centralization in Global FDI: A Network Approach to Tracing Transnational Corporate Control
    A. Abeltino, Tiziano Bacaloni, Andrea Bernardini et al. · 2026 · cited 1 time · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    Understanding how corporate control concentrates in modern ownership systems is crucial in an economy increasingly shaped by cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Rather than expanding productive capacity, these operations reorganize ownership and control over existing firms through complex transnational structures involving financial intermediaries, holding companies, and investment vehicles. As a result, corporate control may become highly concentrated even when formal ownership appears fragmented. This paper examines how foreign direct investments-related capital centralization reshapes firm-level governance by tracing how control converges on individual companies through multi-layered o…

  3. Very close Cites this paper Uses this paper in depth
    The power of corporate control in the global ownership network
    T. Mizuno, Shohei Doi, Shuhei Kurizaki · 2020 · PLoS ONE · cited 26 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    As passive investment through index funds and Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) has become pervasive, the structure of corporate control in the global capital market is more complex than before. We propose a new model and calculation algorithm to measure a shareholder’s power to control corporations in the global economy. Our method takes into account how fragmented voting rights attached to dispersed ownership may be consolidated to generate corporate control. Analyzing the ownership holdings in 49 million companies worldwide by 69 million shareholders in 2016, we find that the landscape of global corporate control appears differently if we adequately evaluate indirect influence via dispersed ow…

  4. Very close Cited by this paper Used in depth by this paper
    Backbone of complex networks of corporations: the flow of control.
    J. Glattfelder, S. Battiston · 2009 · Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics · cited 139 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    We present a methodology to extract the backbone of complex networks based on the weight and direction of links, as well as on nontopological properties of nodes. We show how the methodology can be applied in general to networks in which mass or energy is flowing along the links. In particular, the procedure enables us to address important questions in economics, namely, how control and wealth are structured and concentrated across national markets. We report on the first cross-country investigation of ownership networks, focusing on the stock markets of 48 countries around the world. On the one hand, our analysis confirms results expected on the basis of the literature on corporate control,…

  5. Close Cites this paper
    The Core of the Global Corporate Network
    Ricardo Giglio, T. Lux · 2021 · Networks and Spatial Economics · cited 1 time · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    We investigate the network topology of a comprehensive data set of the world-wide population of corporate entities. In particular, we have extracted information on the boards of all companies listed in Bloomberg’s archive of company profiles in October, 2015, a total of almost 100,000 firms. We provide information on board membership overlaps at various levels, and, in particular, show that there exists a core of directors who accumulate a large number of seats and are highly connected among themselves both at the level of national networks and at the worldwide aggregated level.

  6. Close Cites this paper
    The Corporate Elite Community Structure of Global Capitalism
    Eelke M. Heemskerk, Frank W. Takes · 2015 · New Political Economy · cited 164 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    A key debate on the merits and consequences of globalisation asks to what extent we have moved to a multipolar global political economy. Here we investigate this issue through the properties and topologies of corporate elite networks and ask: what is the community structure of the global corporate elite? In order to answer this question, we analyse how the largest one million firms in the world are interconnected at the level of corporate governance through interlocking directorates. Community detection through modularity maximisation reveals that regional clusters play a fundamental role in the network architecture of the global political economy. Transatlantic connections remain particular…

  7. Close Cites this paper
    Structure and influence in a global capital–ownership network
    Sammy Khalife, Jesse Read, M. Vazirgiannis · 2021 · Applied Network Science · cited 1 time · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    Relationships between legal entities can be represented as a large weighted directed graph. In this work, we model the global capital ownership network across a hundred of millions of such entities with the goal of establishing a methodology for extracting and analysing meaningful patterns of capitalistic influence from the graph structure. To do so, we adapt and employ metrics from graph analytics and algorithms from the area of influence maximization. We characterize the relationships extracted and show that our analysis aligns with information from macro-economic studies; for example it recovers the presence of known tax heavens, which appear in dense subgraphs of countries. We also ident…

  8. Close Cites this paper
    The flow of corporate control in the global ownership network
    T. Mizuno, Shohei Doi, Shuhei Kurizaki · 2023 · PLoS ONE · cited 5 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    We propose a model and algorithm to measure the amount of influence a shareholder has over the flow of corporate control held by the ultimate owners. Existing models of corporate ownership and control either focus on the ultimate owners’ influence or inadequately evaluate the influence possessed by intermediate shareholders in a ownership network. As it extends Network Power Index (NPI) that describes the the power of corporate control possessed by the ultimate owners, our new model, Network Power Flow (NPF), delineates the distribution of ownership influence among shareholders across the network and identifies the channels through which the ultimate owners’ corporate control travel through …

Prior work it builds on

  1. Close
    The Small World of Germany and the Durability of National Networks
    B. Kogut, G. Walker · 2001 · American Sociological Review · cited 515 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    The globalization of financial markets and the concomitant restructuring decisions of firms challenge the historical legacy of national systems of governance. German corporate ownership patterns and restructuring events in the 1990's are examined here in this light. The results show that ownership links among German firms constitute a “small world” that has consequences for understanding mergers and acquisitions. Ownership links form closely-knit clusters affirms that are nonetheless highly connected across the network as a whole. Restructuring events fall squarely in the center of this structure. Despite increasing global competition, the German small world tends to replicate itself. To ill…

  2. Related*
    Corporate Ownership Around the World
    R. la Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, A. Shleifer · 1999 · Journal of Finance · cited 11,526 times · Not summarized yet
  3. Related
    Ownership relations in the presence of cross-shareholding
    E. Dietzenbacher, U. Temurshoev · 2008 · Journal of Economics · cited 51 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    The direct ownership structure in a sector can be readily obtained from data on shareholding. Due to cross-shareholding, however, the true ownership structure may be hidden by a complex network of indirect relations. In studying the property structure, two important aspects are the size of the relations between primary owners (e.g. individuals) and secondary owners (e.g. companies), and the distance between them. The distance is obtained from the average number of secondary owners via whom the relation runs. As an empirical application, we study the banking sector in the Czech Republic, where also the relation between distance and separation of dividend and control rights is discussed.

  4. Related*
    A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control
    G. Davis, Tracy A. Thompson · 1994 · Administrative Science Quarterly · cited 825 times · Not summarized yet
  5. Related*
    The Control of Corporate Europe
    Marco Becht, F. Barca · 2002 · ULB Institutional Repository · cited 747 times · Not summarized yet

Papers that cite it

  1. Close Uses this paper in depth
    The interdependence of corporate reputation and ownership: a network approach to quantify reputation
    Yan Zhang, F. Schweitzer · 2019 · Royal Society Open Science · cited 17 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    We propose a novel way to measure the reputation of firms by using information about their ownership structure. Supported by the signalling theory, we argue that ownership relations channel reputation spillovers between shareholders and their invested companies. We model such reputation spillovers by means of a simple dynamics that runs on the ownership network, constructed from available databases. We focus on the core of the global ownership network with 1300 firms and 12 100 ownership links. Our method assigns an ownership-based reputation value to each firm, used to provide a quantitative reputation ranking. We compare our ranking with alternative rankings, to confirm that the top-ranked…

  2. Close Uses this paper in depth
    CORPORATE OWNERSHIP NETWORK: THE HIERARCHICAL CAPITALISM IN THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT
    Wilton Vicente Gonçalves da Cruz, Mário Sacomano, E. Ribeiro · 2023 · Revista de Administração de Empresas · cited 2 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    ABSTRACT Several studies have indicated a type of hierarchical capitalism in Latin America, characterized by the presence of multinational and state corporations, diversified multi-enterprise groups, low-skilled labor, and segmented labor markets. From the perspective of ownership networks, we explore who the owners of large Brazilian corporations are. These networks reveal actors and groups with prominent positions in the structure and ownership of companies. Thus, this article proposes to 1) describe the ownership network of the largest Brazilian corporations; 2) analyze the density, average degree, modularity, and the number of components connected in this network; 3) analyze measures of …

  3. Close
    Transnational Corporations as ‘Keystone Actors’ in Marine Ecosystems
    Henrik Österblom, Jean‐Baptiste Jouffray, Carl Folke et al. · 2015 · PLoS ONE · cited 277 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    Keystone species have a disproportionate influence on the structure and function of ecosystems. Here we analyze whether a keystone-like pattern can be observed in the relationship between transnational corporations and marine ecosystems globally. We show how thirteen corporations control 11-16% of the global marine catch (9-13 million tons) and 19-40% of the largest and most valuable stocks, including species that play important roles in their respective ecosystem. They dominate all segments of seafood production, operate through an extensive global network of subsidiaries and are profoundly involved in fisheries and aquaculture decision-making. Based on our findings, we define these compani…

  4. Close Uses this paper in depth
    The Effectiveness of National Government Regulation of Large Companies
    Jing Gui · 2023 · International Journal of Education and Humanities · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    This study investigates the dynamic interplay between transnational corporations (TNCs) and their regulatory landscape. TNCs, as major players in the global economy, significantly influence both economic growth and the trajectory of domestic firms in less developed countries. However, this influence isn't always positive. The central theme of this paper is the challenges and complexities national governments face in regulating these corporate giants. Given the backdrop of neoliberalism and globalisation, the regulatory environment is ever-evolving and demands intricate analyses. Key to this is the development of robust governance frameworks which are imperative for striking a harmonious bala…

  5. Close
    The multilayer structure of corporate networks
    J. van Lidth de Jeude, T. Aste, G. Caldarelli · 2019 · New Journal of Physics · cited 25 times · Not summarized yet
    Abstract

    Various company interactions can be described by networks, for instance the ownership networks and the board membership networks. To understand the ecosystem of companies, these interactions cannot be seen in isolation. For this purpose we construct a new multiplex network of interactions between companies in Germany and in the United Kingdom, combining ownership links, social ties through joint board directors, R&D collaborations and stock correlations in one linked multiplex dataset. We describe the features of this network and show there exists a non-trivial overlap between these different types of networks, where the different types of connections complement each other and make the overa…

How are these papers found?

We compare the title and abstract of this paper with those of every paper summarized on this site, and with the papers Semantic Scholar recommends, those it cites and those citing it (for a much-cited paper, its most recent citations and, from OpenAlex, the most cited ones). Among the prior work and the follow-ups, the papers that use each other in depth, a method it uses and the much-cited follow-ups come a little higher. The levels (very close, close, related) come from the similarity of the texts, not from a judgment of quality; * marks a paper without an abstract, compared by its title. The sentence under a paper is written by an AI from the two abstracts: check it in the papers. A paper marked not relevant by three readers leaves the list.

Updated on 2 November 2026.