Résultats de recherche pour « Price Sensitivity »

This paper shows that real decisions depend not only on the total amount of information in prices, but the source of this information—a manager learns from prices when they contain information not possessed by him. We use the staggered enforcement of insider trading laws across 27 countries as a shock to the source of information that leaves total information unchanged: enforcement reduces (increases) managers’ (outsiders’) contribution to the stock price. Consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, enforcement increases investment-q sensitivity, even when controlling for total price informativeness. The effect is larger in industries where learning is likely to be stronger, and in emerging countries where outsider information acquisition rises most post-enforcement. Enforcement does not increase the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, a non-price measure of investment opportunities. These findings suggest that extant measures of price efficiency should be rethought when evaluating real efficiency. More broadly, our paper provides causal evidence that managers learn from prices, by using a shock to price informativeness.

This article builds on the double role of the effect of prices on the choice of tourism activities: not only is it the sole component of the destination marketing mix that represents revenue but also a determinant factor in tourist choice. On this account, identifying patterns of tourists with different degrees of sensitivities to prices would help destinations design an appropriate bundle of activities and have a clear definition of the segment they should try to attract. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to identify tourist segments from individual price sensitivities to activities. The results show—although price has a dissuasive influence on the choice of activities—a differentiated effect (as this dissuasiveness is not general for all individuals); this heterogeneous responsiveness to price supports its use as a segmentation criterion. In the empirical application, four segments are found with significantly different price sensitivities.

Consumer price sensitivity is studied in the context of supermarket grocery shopping using a survey of supermarket shoppers. It is shown that price sensitivity depends both on product features and consumer characteristics. Price laws such as Webers law and the Weber-Fechner law are empirically investigated. Shopper profiles are identified on the basis of price sensitivity by discriminant analysis of variables representing consumer demographics, shopping behavior, and price awareness.

In today's world, due to renewed and changing consumer demands and the rapidly developing technological factors, companies and managers are in search of new strategies to make a difference in their products and services. As competition increased marketers started to focus on new approaches and product innovations to attract consumers’ perception and attention. One of the most effective ways of differentiating is using aesthetics. Visual aesthetics of products creates value for consumers. Visual aesthetics create significant value for product and makes it more special. Also, level of price sensitivity of consumer decreases when the product is more unique and prestigious. This study aims to investigate the relationship between visual aesthetics of products and consumers’ price sensitivity. The data of the study is collected via a survey form from 510 respondents from Eskisehir, Turkey. The results revealed that visual aesthetics of products and also its sub-dimensions including value, acumen, and response are negatively associated with consumers’ price sensitivity. Explanatory power of response dimension was higher than its counterparts.

We study firms that sell multiple substitutable products and customers whose purchase behavior follows a Nested Logit model, of which the Multinomial Logit model is a special case. Customers make purchasing decision sequentially under the Nested Logit model: they first select a nest of products and subsequently purchase one within the selected nest. We consider the multi-product pricing problem under the general Nested Logit model with product-differentiated price sensitivities and arbitrary nest coefficients. We show that the adjusted markup, defined as price minus cost minus the reciprocal of price sensitivity, is constant for all products within a nest at optimality. This reduces the problem’s dimension to a single variable per nest. We also show that the adjusted nest-level markup is nest-invariant for all the nests, which further reduces the problem to maximizing a single-variable unimodal function under mild conditions. We also use this result to simplify the oligopolistic multi-product price competition and characterize the Nash equilibrium. We also consider more general attraction functions that include the linear utility and the multiplicative competitive interaction models as special cases, and show that similar techniques can be used to significantly simplify the corresponding pricing problems.

The literature contains evidence that there is a marked heterogeneity in price responses to tourism products, leading to a great variety of tourist sensitivities to price. Thus the role price plays is complex, and a particularly challenging aspect of this complexity is that its effect is not unambiguous, thereby negating the idea that the demand for tourism products and tourist activities can always be regarded as demand for ordinary goods. This article identifies and explains, as a novelty for the tourism industry, price sensitivities to tourism activities individual by individual. The operative formalization uses a mixed logit model to estimate the individual sensitivities to price, and then a regression analysis is applied to detect their determinants. The empirical application finds that motivations, influenced by age, and length of stay with a non-linear effect, are explanatory factors of tourists' price sensitivity to activities.

AIM: To estimate the price sensitivity of consumer choice of health insurance firm. METHOD: Using paneldata of the flows of insured between pairs of Dutch sickness funds during the period 1993-2002, we estimate the sensitivity of these flows to differences in insurance premium. RESULTS: The price elasticity of residual demand for health insurance was low during the period 1993-2002, confirming earlier findings based on annual changes in market share. We find small but significant elasticities for basic insurance but insignificant elasticities for supplementary insurance. Young enrollees are more price sensitive than older enrollees. CONCLUSION: Competition was weak in the market for health insurance during the period under study. For the market-based reforms that are currently under way, this implies that measures to promote competition in the health insurance industry may be needed.

Recent consumer research suggests that lowering search costs for quality information reduces consumer price sensitivity by creating greater perceived differentiation among brands (e.g., Kaul and Wittink 1995; Lynch and Ariely 2000). We argue that lowering quality search costs by smart agents can have the opposite effect on differentiation and price sensitivity. Smart agents screen through a universe of alternatives, recommending only a handful well-matched to the customer's quality preferences. In this research, we ask and answer the following questions: In markets in which price and quality are uncorrelated, will the use of screening agents increase or decrease prices paid compared to searching from an unordered list of options? Will increasing the size of the store's underlying assortment increase or decrease prices paid when options have been screened on quality? In markets where higher priced goods have higher quality, will the use of screening agents increase or decrease prices paid and quality selected? Experiments 1 and 2 test the effect of quality screening when price and quality are uncorrelated. We then present an analytic model for markets in which price and quality are correlated. We deduce that ordering can cause price and quality to increase or decrease depending on the slope of the price-quality relationship in comparison with the relative importance of price in the utility function. We find support for this model in experiment 3.