Majority is not Needed: A Counterstrategy to Selfish Mining
Authors: Jonathan Gal, Maytal B Szabo
Abstract: In the last few years several papers investigated selfish mine attacks, most of which assumed that every miner that is not part of the selfish mine pool will continue to mine honestly. However, in reality, remaining honest is not always incentivized, particularly when another pool is employing selfish mining or other deviant strategies. In this work we explore the scenario in which a large enough pool capitalises on another selfish pool to gain 100\% of the profit and commit double spending attacks. We show that this counterstrategy can effectively counter any deviant strategy, and that even the possibility of it discourages other pools from implementing deviant strategies.
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