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    Veronika Solopova, Oana-Iuliana Popescu, Christoph Benzmüller, Tim Landgraf

    Abstract The full-scale conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine generated an unprecedented amount of news articles and social media data reflecting opposing ideologies and narratives. These polarized campaigns have led to mutual accusations of misinformation and fake news, shaping …

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    Abstract The full-scale conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine generated an unprecedented amount of news articles and social media data reflecting opposing ideologies and narratives. These polarized campaigns have led to mutual accusations of misinformation and fake news, shaping an atmosphere of confusion and mistrust for readers worldwide. This study analyses how the media affected and mirrored public opinion during the first month of the war using news articles and Telegram news channels in Ukrainian, Russian, Romanian, French and English. We propose and compare two methods of multilingual automated pro-Kremlin propaganda identification, based on Transformers and linguistic features. We analyse the advantages and disadvantages of both methods, their adaptability to new genres and languages, and ethical considerations of their usage for content moderation. With this work, we aim to lay the foundation for further development of moderation tools tailored to the current conflict.

    Felipe Bonow Soares, Anatoliy Gruzd, Philip Mai

    As Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, social media was rife with pro-Kremlin disinformation. To effectively tackle the issue of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, this study examines the underlying reasons why some individuals are susceptible to false …

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    As Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, social media was rife with pro-Kremlin disinformation. To effectively tackle the issue of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, this study examines the underlying reasons why some individuals are susceptible to false claims and explores ways to reduce their susceptibility. It uses linear regression analysis on data from a national survey of 1,500 adults (18+) to examine the factors that predict belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives regarding the Russia–Ukraine war. Our research finds that belief in Pro-Kremlin disinformation is politically motivated and linked to users who: (1) hold conservative views, (2) trust partisan media, and (3) frequently share political opinions on social media. Our findings also show that exposure to disinformation is positively associated with belief in disinformation. Conversely, trust in mainstream media is negatively associated with belief in disinformation, offering a potential way to mitigate its impact.

    Lowell H. Schwartz
    Lowell H. Schwartz
    Lowell H. Schwartz
    Lowell H. Schwartz
    Paulina Polko

    The Russian Federation’s disinformation activity is widely recognised in academic research. Classified as part of cognitive warfare, disinformation is a key tool used by Putin’s regime to promote the Russian perspective on international relations and to assess states and their …

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    The Russian Federation’s disinformation activity is widely recognised in academic research. Classified as part of cognitive warfare, disinformation is a key tool used by Putin’s regime to promote the Russian perspective on international relations and to assess states and their policies. Disinformation covers a range of topics, including issues that may divide public opinion, such as migration. This paper analyses 240 instances of pro-Kremlin disinformation on migration from 2015 to 2024, drawn from the East Stratcom Task Force (EUvsDisinfo project) database, with a primary focus on European cohesion and security. The results indicate a multidimensional portrayal of migration as a threat to European countries and societies, orchestrated, according to the sources of disinformation, by US foreign policy, EU migration policy, and the political correctness of the member states’ governments.