Search Results for « Norm Emergence »

Abstract Norms are utilised in agent societies to encourage acceptable behaviour by the participating agents. They can be established or revised from the top-down (authority) or from the bottom-up (populace). The study of norm creation from the bottom-up—or norm emergence/convergence—shows evidence of increasing activity. In consequence, we seek to analyse and categorize the approaches proposed in the literature for facilitating norm emergence. This paper makes three contributions to the study of norm emergence. Firstly, we present the different perspectives of norms and their impact on the norm emergence process, with the aim of comparing their similarities and differences in implementing the norm life cycle. Secondly, we identify the characteristics that support norm emergence that are observed in the emergence literature. Finally, we identify and propose future topics for study for the community, through a discussion of the challenges and opportunities in norm emergence.

Social norms are the glue that holds society together, yet our knowledge of them remains heavily intellectually siloed. This article provides an interdisciplinary review of the emerging field of norm dynamics by integrating research across the social sciences through a cultural-evolutionary lens. After reviewing key distinctions in theory and method, we discuss research on norm psychology-the neural and cognitive underpinnings of social norm learning and acquisition. We then overview how norms emerge and spread through intergenerational transmission, social networks, and group-level ecological and historical factors. Next, we discuss multilevel factors that lead norms to persist, change, or erode over time. We also consider cultural mismatches that can arise when a changing environment leads once-beneficial norms to become maladaptive. Finally, we discuss potential future research directions and the implications of norm dynamics for theory and policy.

Norms are a valuable mechanism for establishing coherent cooperative behaviour in decentralised systems in which no central authority exists. One of the most influential formulations of norm emergence was proposed by Axelrod, who defined a model of norms and metanorms that enables norm establishment in populations of self-interested individuals. This paper provides an empirical analysis of aspects of Axelrod's approach, by exploring some of the key assumptions made in previous evaluations of the model. First, we explore the dynamics of norm emergence and the occurrence of norm collapse when applying the model over extended durations. Second, we investigate in detail the reasons for norm collapse in extended applications of the model and show that both the level of mutation in the population and the precise nature of the reproduction mechanism are significant. Our findings identify characteristics that significantly influence norm establishment using Axelrod's formulation, but are likely to be of importance for norm establishment more generally.

In multi-agent systems norms are an important influence that can engender cooperation by constraining actions and binding groups together. A key question is how to establish a suitable set of norms in a decentralised population of self-interested agents, especially where individual agents might not adhere to the rules of the system. In this paper we investigate the problem of norm emergence, and the related issue of group recognition, using tag-based cooperation as the interaction model. We explore characteristics that affect the longevity and adoption of norms in tag-based cooperation, and provide an empirical evaluation of existing techniques for supporting cooperation in the presence of cheaters.

The rapid and widespread emergence of an anti-plastic shopping bag norm and associated regulatory policies around the world in recent years forces a rethinking of current understandings of norm dynamics and policy implementation. The patterns of this movement are explored and characterised as a South to North, non-networked and multi-scalar series of events that together represent a globally significant emergence of a new environmental norm. It also shows that differences in policy outcomes as a response to this norm in different countries and at different jurisdictional levels are in many ways linked to the influence of material interests in the interpretation of the norm into policy. These variations in domestic norm interpretation in turn influence international norm dynamics.

The research on international norms offers several models of their evolution; however, a convincing model specifically depicting the phase of norm emergence is still lacking. Macro models (e.g. the norm life cycle) focus on the overall evolution of norms and distinguish the emergence phase as one among others, but they remain too rough. Meso models focus on a specific phase, but on phases other than norm emergence, such as diffusion (e.g. the signalling model) or enforcement (e.g. the spiral model). If they do focus on emergence, this focus remains case-specific and lacks theorisation. Micro models (e.g. the persuasion model or the funnelling model) focus on specific sequences within a phase. In this article, I develop one model of norm emergence by conceptualising it as the diffusion of a problem through different agendas and the discursive transformation of a problem into a (problem-solving) norm. The model distinguishes four sequences of norm emergence: problem adoption by norm entrepreneurs; issue creation in the public sphere; candidate norm creation in the institutional-deliberative sphere; and norm creation in multilateral negotiations. I illustrate the utility of this model by tracing the emergence of the norm against cluster munitions.

Multi-agent systems provide a basis for developing systems of autonomous entities and thus find application in a variety of domains. We consider a setting where not only the member agents are adaptive but also the multi-agent system viewed as an entity in its own right is adaptive. Specifically, the social structure of a multi-agent system can be reflected in the social norms among its members. It is well recognized that the norms that arise in society are not always beneficial to its members. We focus on prosocial norms, which help achieve positive outcomes for society and often provide guidance to agents to act in a manner that takes into account the welfare of others. Specifically, we propose Cha, a framework for the emergence of prosocial norms. Unlike previous norm emergence approaches, Cha supports continual change to a system (agents may enter and leave) and dynamism (norms may change when the environment changes). Importantly, Cha agents incorporate prosocial decision-making based on inequity aversion theory, reflecting an intuition of guilt arising from being antisocial. In this manner, Cha brings together two important themes in prosociality: decision-making by individuals and fairness of system-level outcomes. We demonstrate via simulation that Cha can improve aggregate societal gains and fairness of outcomes.

Peer punishment has been an effective means to ensure that norms are complied with in a population of self-interested agents. However, current approaches to establishing norms have only considered static punishments, which do not vary with the magnitude or frequency of norm violation. Such static punishments are difficult to apply because it is difficult to identify an appropriate fixed penalty: one that is not too weak to disincentivise norm violations and not too strong to lead to significant deleterious effects on the system as a whole (such as those incurred by losing the benefits of a member of the population). This paper addresses this concern by developing an adaptive punishment technique that tailors penalty to norm violation. An experimental evaluation of the approach demonstrates its value compared to static punishment. In particular, the results show that our dynamic punishment technique is capable of achieving norm emergence, even when starting with an amount of punishment that is too low to achieve emergence in the traditional static approach.

Every agent in a society initially possesses a set of personal norms. Group norms emerge when agents interact with one another and exchange information in such a way that multiple agents begin to acquire the same personal norm. This emergence is the result of information transmission, social enforcement, and internalization. If a population contains a single group norm, as a result of every agent in the population acquiring the same personal norm, then it can be said that a consensus has been reached by the population. We model the formation of consensus in silico by adapting a recently developed model of norm emergence to a multi-agent simulation. A screening experiment is conducted to identify the significant parameters of our model and verify that our model is capable of producing a consensus. The experimental results show that our model can attain consensus as well as two additional states of information equilibrium. The results also indicate that both network structure and agent behavior play an important role in the formation of consensus. In addition, it is shown that the formation of consensus is sensitive to the simulation parameter settings, and certain values can prevent its formation entirely.