Résultats de recherche pour « Norm Emergence »

<p>The Arms Trade Treaty brings together a number of small arms control norms into one instrument and is a new initiative, which was instigated by state and NGO norm entrepreneurs. This thesis attempts to understand what has led to the emergence of these norms in the Arms Trade Treaty, in what will be termed a ‘cluster’ of small arms norms. Examining the small arms norms associated with the Arms Trade Treaty will explain their development and their likelihood of successfully being incorporated into this instrument. Analysis of the development of the norms related to the Arms Trade Treaty will explore the relationship between norms, their promoters and their opponents. This thesis will do this by providing detailed analysis of the development of specific norms in a series of case studies: control over arms brokering, transfers to non-state actors and civilian possession. It will place this development within the broader context of the ATT instrument and the international society in which it is emerging into. This thesis finds that power and powerful states have a significant role to play in the emergence of norms, in some cases despite the efforts of norm promoters. Norms were not able to emerge in their original form due to the influence of powerful states, which resulted in norms evolving in different directions or not emerging at all.</p>

This article develops a procedural model of behavioral norm emergence based on the recursive interplay of social action and social feedback. Behavioral norms, shared expectations about appropriate conduct, are foundational to social organization, yet their formation and dynamics remain difficult to model concretely. We address this challenge by using social feedback received in response to behavior as the core mechanism linking individual action to collective patterns. Our model shows how agents monitor and adapt their behavior based on feedback, leading to the stabilization of shared practices, the emergence of reputation hierarchies, and the diffusion of norms through imitation and influence. These dynamics drive the co-evolution of norms and social networks, with reputation connecting individual behavior to broader patterns of coordination and social order. While existing theories often focus on "why" behavioral norms exist, our model addresses the "how". We argue that norms are not merely imposed from above, but co-constructed from below through iterative acts of validation and imitation.

This article develops a procedural model of behavioral norm emergence based on the recursive interplay of social action and social feedback. Behavioral norms, shared expectations about appropriate conduct, are foundational to social organization, yet their formation and dynamics remain difficult to model concretely. We address this challenge by using social feedback received in response to behavior as the core mechanism linking individual action to collective patterns. Our model shows how agents monitor and adapt their behavior based on feedback, leading to the stabilization of shared practices, the emergence of reputation hierarchies, and the diffusion of norms through imitation and influence. These dynamics drive the co-evolution of norms and social networks, with reputation connecting individual behavior to broader patterns of coordination and social order. While existing theories often focus on "why" behavioral norms exist, our model addresses the "how". We argue that norms are not merely imposed from above, but co-constructed from below through iterative acts of validation and imitation.

We ask how Lorentzian causal structure can emerge from a pregeometric substrate. For a rigorously defined class of finite–range, ferromagnetically coupled “chronon” models with quartic norm pinning, we prove the existence, with strictly positive Gibbs probability, of a macroscopic percolating domain \(D\subset M\) on which the coarse–grained field \(\Phi^\mu\) is smooth, future–directed, unit–norm timelike (\(\Phi^\mu\Phi_\mu=-1\), \(\Phi^0>0\)) and twist–free. We work on a smooth differentiable manifold but do not assume Lorentzian signature or a global time field a priori; these arise on \(D\) from the dynamics.Under four operational axioms—well-posed local dynamics, finite-speed signalling, acyclic causal order, and stable memory/records—we further prove that no alternative (Euclidean or ultrahyperbolic) signature, nor a Lorentzian background lacking a globally unit–norm time field, can sustain such behavior; the Lorentzian, unit–norm phase is therefore exclusive.Finally, we show that “measurement” acts as a boundary-induced selector of this phase: an interface coupling to an aligned apparatus field \(\Phi_A\) admits a unique minimizer, pins the norm and alignment, suppresses twist, and drives any initial state to the aligned phase with exponential convergence; large-deviation bounds quantify high-fidelity selection.While our theorems hold for general \((1,d)\) signatures with \(d\ge 1\), heuristic coarse-graining and stability considerations suggest \(d=3\) as the most probable large-scale outcome. Together, these results provide a mathematically controlled foundation for the emergence and exclusivity of Lorentzian causal structure and for boundary-driven selection (measurement) in pregeometric ensembles.

Social norms are the glue that holds society together, yet our knowledge of them remains heavily intellectually siloed. This article provides an interdisciplinary review of the emerging field of norm dynamics by integrating research across the social sciences through a cultural-evolutionary lens. After reviewing key distinctions in theory and method, we discuss research on norm psychology—the neural and cognitive underpinnings of social norm learning and acquisition. We then overview how norms emerge and spread through intergenerational transmission, social networks, and group-level ecological and historical factors. Next, we discuss multilevel factors that lead norms to persist, change, or erode over time. We also consider cultural mismatches that can arise when a changing environment leads once-beneficial norms to become maladaptive. Finally, we discuss potential future research directions and the implications of norm dynamics for theory and policy.

Social norms are such powerful drivers of human behavior that people conform to social norms even when they would prefer to violate them or when conforming is not in their personal material interest. Researchers have theorized that in these cases, people conform to avoid the social and psychological costs of deviance (e.g., guilt, self-deprecation, punishment). Notwithstanding the possible costs, people do decide to violate norms. We conducted two randomized experiments (N = 3,499) to explore the behavioral and psychological consequences of deviating from norms. Participants played behavioral games governed by norms of cooperation, without a mechanism for players to punish one another. Participants assigned to the treatment condition, unlike those in the control condition, were offered a monetary incentive to deviate from a strong norm of cooperation in one round of the game. Violating this norm significantly increased their propensity to violate other social norms in new settings involving new groups and new games (with no incentive to deviate). Post-treatment survey data suggest that violating norms causes people to depreciate their expectation of the costs associated with violation, but does not lead them to update their views of the self. Together, these results challenge and inform traditional views of deviance as personality or a stable individual motivation or trait, and suggest that deviance can emerge from an experience of deviance at any point in one's life.